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Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but
few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we
propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals
have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their
strategies according to their neighbors’ strategies and payoffs at the beginning of each new
season of epidemic spreading. We found a counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the
well-known Braess’s Paradox, namely a better condition may lead to worse performance.
Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate of self-protection does not necessarily
reduce the epidemic size or improve the system payoff. This phenomenon is insensitive
to the network topologies, and can be well explained by a mean-field approximation. Our
study demonstrates an important fact that a better condition for individuals may yield a
worse outcome for the society.
∗Electronic address: zhutou@ustc.edu
2I. INTRODUCTION
Recent outbreaks of global infectious diseases, including SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome), H1N1 (Swine Influenza) and H5H1 (Avian Influenza), have caused major public
healthy threats owing to their potential mortalities and substantial economic impacts. Accord-
ing to the report of WHO, infectious diseases cause more than 10 million deaths annually and
accounting for 23% of the global disease burden [1]. Various interventions thus have been de-
veloped to control infectious diseases, such as vaccination, treatment, quarantining and behavior
change programs (e.g., social distancing and partner reduction) [2].
Though preemptive vaccination is the fundamental method for preventing transmission of in-
fectious diseases as well as reducing morbidity and mortality [3–5], practically, the immunization
of individuals is more than a voluntary behavior owing to the economic costs, logistical limita-
tions, religious reasons, side effects, and so on [6]. Therefore, instead of vaccinating, people may
prefer to take some self-protective actions including reducing outside activities, detouring to avoid
epidemic areas, wearing face masks, washing hands frequently, and so forth [7–10]. Generally
speaking, these self-protective actions are less costly and cannot guarantee the safety against the
diseases.
Under such complicated environment, an individual’s strategy usually results from a tradeoff
between cost and risk. For instance, people may be laissez-faire to the spreading of common flu,
while they will take vaccination for hepatitis B since the vaccines are very effective and hepati-
tis B is very difficult to be eradicated. In contrast, people prefer to take self-protection against
HIV since its consequence is terrible while the effectivity and side effects of vaccines are both
unknown. Accordingly, game-theoretic models may be suitable to characterize these decision-
making processes [3, 4, 11–14]. Bauch et al. [3, 4] analyzed population behavior under voluntary
vaccination policies for childhood diseases via a game-theoretic framework, and they found that
voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-level optimum due to the risk perception in
vaccines and the effect of herd immunity. Bauch [11] studied a game model in which individuals
adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamics, and found that oscillations in vaccine uptake
can emerge under different conditions, for example, vaccinating behavior is very sensitive to the
changes in disease prevalence. Vardavas et al. [12] considered the effects of voluntary vaccination
on the prevalence of influenza based on a minority game, and found that severe epidemics could
not be prevented unless vaccination programs offer incentives. Basu et al. [13] proposed an epi-
3demic game model for HPV vaccination based on the survey data on actual perceptions regarding
cervical caner, showing that the actual vaccination level is far lower than the overall vaccination
goals. Perisic and Bauch [14] studied the interplay between epidemic spreading dynamics and
individual vaccinating behavior on social contact networks. Compared with the homogeneously
mixing model, they found that increasing the neighborhood size of the contact network can elim-
inate the disease if individuals decide whether to vaccinate by accounting for infection risks from
neighbors.
As mentioned above, in most related works, individuals are usually divided into two opposite
classes: vaccinated and laissez-faire, while less attention is paid on other alterative strategies in
between. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary epidemic game model to study the effects of
self-protection on the system payoff and epidemic size. We find a counter-intuitive phenomenon
analogous to the well-known Braess’s Paradox [15] in network traffic, that is, the increasing of
successful rate of self-protection may, on the contrary, decrease the system payoff. We provide a
mean-field solution, which well reproduces such observations. This study raises an unprecedent
challenge on how to lead the masses of people when facing an epidemic, since sufficient knowl-
edge about and effective protecting skills to the infectious disease, which sound very helpful for
every individual, may eventually enlarge the epidemic size and cause losses for the society.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
Considering a seasonal flu-like disease that spreads through a social contact network [16, 17].
At the beginning of a season, each individual could choose one of the three strategies: vaccination,
self-protection or laissez faire. If an individual gets infected during this epidemic season, she will
pay a cost r. A vaccinated individual will pay a cost c that accounts for not only the monetary
cost of the vaccine, but also the perceived vaccine risks, side effects, long-term healthy impacts,
and so on. We assume that the vaccine could perfectly protect vaccinated individuals. A self-
protective individual will pay a less cost b, while a laissez-faire individual pays nothing. Denote
δ the successful rate of self-protection, that is, a self-protective individual will be equivalent to a
vaccinated individual with probability δ or be equivalent to a laissez-faire individual with proba-
bility 1− δ. This will be determined right after an individual’s decision for simplicity. Obviously,
r > c > b > 0. Without loss of generality, we set the cost of being infected as r = 1. Table 1
presents the payoffs for different strategies and outcomes.
4TABLE I: The payoffs for different strategies and outcomes.
Healthy Infected
Laissez-faire 0 −1
Self-protected −b −1− b
Vaccinated −c N/A
When the strategy of every individual is fixed, all individuals can be divided into two classes:
susceptible ones including laissez-faire individuals and part of self-protective individuals, and
irrelevant individuals (they are equivalent to be removed from the system) including vaccinated
ones and all other self-protective individuals. The susceptible individuals probably get infected
while the irrelevant individuals will not affect or be affected by the epidemic dynamics. Among
all susceptible individuals, I0 individuals are randomly selected and set to be infected initially. The
spreading dynamics follows the standard susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model [18], where at
each time step, each infected individual will infect all her susceptible neighbors with probability λ,
and then she will turn to be a removed individual with probability µ. The spreading ends when no
infected individual exists. Then, the number of removed individuals, R∞, is called the epidemic
size or the prevalence.
After this epidemic season, every individual updates her strategy by imitating her neighbor-
hood. Firstly, she will randomly select one neighbor and then decide whether to take this neigh-
bor’s strategy. We apply the Fermi rule [19, 20], namely an individual i will adopt the selected
neighbor j’s strategy with probability
W (si ← sj) =
1
1 + exp[−κ(Pj − Pi)]
, (1)
where si means the strategy of i, Pi is i’s payoff in the last season, and the parameter κ > 0
characterizes the strength of selection: smaller κ means that individuals are less responsive to
payoff difference. After the moment all individuals have decided their strategies (and thus their
roles in the epidemic spreading are also decided), a new season starts.
III. RESULTS
We first study the model on square lattices with von Neumann neighborhood and periodic
boundary conditions. Figure 1(a) presents the effects of the successful rate of self-protection, δ,
5on the decision makings of individuals and the epidemic size. Clearly, as the increasing of δ,
the condition gets better and better. A counter-intuitive phenomenon is observed when δ lies in
the middle range (from about 0.3 to about 0.4), during which a better condition leads to a larger
epidemic size. One may think that though the epidemic size becomes larger, the system payoff
(the sum payoff of all individuals) could still get higher since individuals pay less in choosing
self-protection than vaccination. However, as shown in figure 1(b) and 1(c), the system payoff
is strongly negatively correlated with the epidemic size. That is to say, a better condition (i.e., a
larger δ) could result in worse performance in view of both the larger epidemic size and the less
system payoff. This is very similar to the so-called Braess’s Paradox, which states that adding
extra capacity to a network when the moving entities selfishly choose their route, can in some
cases reduce overall performance [15, 21].
Figure 2 shows the strategy distribution patterns of four representative cases. When δ is small, it
is unwise to take self-protection because of its low efficiency, and people prefer to take vaccination
or laissez faire. As shown in figure 2(b), there are only two strategies, vaccination and laissez faire,
and thus δ has no effect on the epidemic size. Both infected and not infected laissez-faire individ-
uals form percolating clusters, and are nearly (not fully) separated by vaccinated individuals. Of
course, this kind of partial separation can only be possible when the number of vaccinated individ-
uals is considerable. When δ gets larger, more and more individuals take self-protection and fewer
and fewer individuals take vaccination or laissez faire. Since only a fraction, δ, of self-protective
individuals are equivalent to the vaccinated individuals, the system contains more susceptible indi-
viduals. In addition, these susceptible individuals are less protected since the number of irrelevant
individuals becomes smaller. Such two factors lead to the increase of the epidemic size and the
decrease of the system payoff. As shown in figure 2(c), the light-red percolating cluster is frag-
mented into pieces due to the decrease of irrelevant individuals, which is also a reason of the
decrease of the fraction of laissez-faire individuals: being laissez-faire becomes more risky now.
When δ is large, the superiority of self-protection becomes more striking and no one takes vacci-
nation, then the epidemic size decreases as δ increases. As shown in figure 2(d), self-protective
and laissez-faire individuals coexist. As the increasing of δ, though the self-protection strategy is
more efficient, the laissez faire strategy is more attractive since the irrelevant individuals becomes
more and thus for susceptible individuals, the risk of being infected becomes smaller. This is the
reason why the fraction of laissez-faire individuals become more and more in the right range. In
fact, when δ is very large, the laissez-faire and not infected individuals again form a percolating
6cluster. Please see figure 2(e) for the example case at δ = 0.95.
Figures S1-S5 verify the universality of the counter-intuitive phenomenon. Figure S1 reports
the epidemic size as a function of δ for square lattices with different sizes, suggesting that our
main results are insensitive to the network size. To verify the insensitivity to network structures,
we implement the model on disparate networks including the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks [22], the
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks [23] and the well-mixed networks (i.e., fully connected networks
or called complete networks). As shown in figure 3, in despite to the quantitative difference, the
counter-intuitive phenomenon is observed for all kinds of networks. Figures S2-S5 present system-
atical simulation results about the effects of different parameters on different kinds of networks.
For every kind of networks, one can observe the counter-intuitive phenomenon when the condition
0 < b < c < 1 is hold.
Although the phenomenon is qualitatively universal for different kinds of networks, as shown in
figure 3, there are quantitative differences between square lattices and other kinds of networks: (i)
in ER, BA and well-mixed networks, the self-protection strategy gets promoted and could become
the sole strategy in a certain range of δ; (ii) the epidemic size in ER, BA and well-mixed networks is
smaller than that in square lattices. In square lattices, laissez-faire individuals could form clusters
that are guarded by the surrounding irrelevant individuals. Then they paid nothing but can escape
from the infection. On the contrary, ER, BA and well-mixed networks do not display localized
property and thus to choose laissez-faire strategy is of high risk. Therefore, with delocalization,
the laissez-faire strategy is depressed while the self-protection strategy gets promoted and less
individuals will get infected.
To verify the above inference, we remove a number of edges in the square lattice and randomly
add the same number of edges. During this randomizing process, the network connectivity is
always guaranteed and the self-connections and multi-connections are always not allowed. The
number of removed edges, A, can be used to quantify the strength of delocalization. As shown
in figure 4, with the increasing of A, the self-protection strategy gets promoted and the clusters
of not infected laissez-faire individuals are fragmented into small pieces. When A gets larger and
larger, the strategy distribution pattern becomes closer and closer to that of ER, BA and well-mixed
networks. The gradually changing process in figure 4 clearly demonstrates that the main reason
resulting in the quantitative differences is the structural localization effects. In a word, the ER, BA
and well-mixed display essentially the same results since they do not have many localized clusters.
Lastly, we present an analytical solution based on the mean-field approximation for well-mixed
7networks (see Methods), which could reproduce the counter-intuitive phenomenon. Figure 5 com-
pares the analytical prediction with simulation, indicating a good accordance.
IV. DISCUSSION
Spontaneous behavioral responses to epidemic situation are recognized to have significant
impacts on epidemic spreading, and thus to incorporating human behavior into epidemiological
models can enhance the models’ utility in mimicking the reality and evaluating control measures
[24–30]. To this end, we proposed an evolutionary epidemic game where individuals can choose
their strategies towards infectious diseases and adjust their strategies according to their neighbors’
strategies and payoffs.
Strikingly, we found a counter-intuitive phenomenon that a better condition (i.e., larger suc-
cessful rate of self-protection) may unfortunately result in less system payoff. It is because when
the successful rate of self-protection increases, people become more speculative and less interested
in vaccination. Since a vaccinated individual indeed brings benefit to the system by statistically
reducing the infection probability of susceptible individuals, the decreasing of vaccinated individ-
uals will eventually lead to the loss of system payoff. Qualitatively speaking, the counter-intuitive
phenomenon is insensitive to the network topology, while quantitatively speaking, networks with
delocalized structure (e.g., ER, BA and well-mixed networks) have more self-protective individu-
als and less laissez-faire individuals than networks with localized structure (e.g., square lattices),
and the epidemic size is larger in the latter case. Without the diverse behavioral responses of
individuals, epidemic in delocalized structure usually spreads more quickly and widely than in
localized structure [31, 32]. The opposite observation reported in the current model again results
from more and more speculative choices (i.e., to be laissez-faire) at a low-risky situation. There-
fore, this can be considered as another kind of “less payoff in better condition” phenomenon.
The observed counter-intuitive phenomenon reminds us of the well-known Braess’s Paradox
in network traffic [15, 21]. Zhang et al. [33] showed that to remove some specific edges in a
network can largely enhance its information throughput, and Youn et al. [34] pointed out that
some roads in Boston, New York City and London could be closed to reduce predicted travel
times. Actually, Seoul has removed a highway to build up a park, which, beyond all expecta-
tions, maintained the same traffic but reduced the travel time [35]. Very recently, Pala et al. [36]
showed that Braess’s Paradox may occur in mesoscopic electron systems, that is, adding a path for
8electrons in a nanoscopic network may paradoxically reduce its conductance. This work provides
another interesting example analogous to Braess’s Paradox, namely a higher successful rate of
self-protection may eventually enlarge the epidemic size and thus cause system loss. Let’s think
of the prisoner’s dilemma, if every prisoner stays silent, they will be fine, while one more choice,
to betray, makes the situation worse for them. Analogously, if the successful rate δ is small, few
people will choose to be self-protective, while for larger δ, people have more choices, which may
eventually reduce the number of vaccinated people and thus enlarge the epidemic size. Basically,
both the original Braess’s Paradox and the current counter-intuitive phenomenon are partially due
to the additional choices to selfish individuals. This is easy to be understood in a simple model
like the prisoner’s dilemma game, but it is impressive to observe such phenomenon in a complex
epidemic game.
Human-activated systems are usually much more complex than our expectation, since people’s
choices and actions are influenced by the environment and at the same time their choices and
actions have changed the environment. This kind of interplay leads to many unexpected collective
responses to both emergencies and carefully designed policies, which, fortunately, can still be
modeled and analyzed to some extent. This work raises an unprecedent challenge to the public
health agencies about how to lead the population towards an epidemic. The government should
take careful consideration on how to distribute their resources and money on popularizing vaccine,
hospitalization, self-protection, self-treatment, and so on.
V. METHODS
Given a well-mixed network with size N , the dynamical equations are
dS
dt
= −λNSI, (2)
dI
dt
= λNSI − µI, (3)
dR
dt
= µI, (4)
where S, I and R stand for the fraction of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals, respec-
tively. Dividing Eq. (2) by Eq. (4), one has
dS
dR
= −R0S, (5)
9TABLE II: The payoffs for different strategies and states. PV , PS and PL stand for average payoffs for
individuals with strategy vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, while the superscripts H (healthy)
and I (infected) represent the final states.
Strategy & State Fraction Payoff
Vaccinated & Healthy ρV PV = −c
Self-protective & Healthy ρHS = ρS [δ + (1− δ)(1 − ω)] PHS = −b
Self-protective & Infected ρIS = ρS(1− δ)ω P IS = −b− 1
Laissez-faire & Healthy ρHL = (1− ρV − ρS)(1− ω) PHL = 0
Laissez-faire & Infected ρIL = (1− ρV − ρS)ω P IL = −1
where R0 = λNµ is the basic reproduction number for the standard SIR model in well-mixed
population [18]. Integrating Eq. (5), we get
∫ S(∞)
S(0)
dS
S
=
∫ R(∞)
R(0)
−R0dR, (6)
which leads to the solution
ln
S(∞)
S(0)
= −R0[R(∞)− R(0)]. (7)
Clearly, R(0) = 0, R(∞) + S(∞) = 1, and in the thermodynamic limit, S(0) ≈ 1. Accordingly,
R(∞) = 1− exp [−R0R(∞)] . (8)
Let ρV , ρS and ρL be the fraction of vaccinated, self-protective and laissez-faire individuals,
such that ρV + ρS + ρL ≡ 1. Since only a fraction 1 − ρV + δρS of individuals are susceptible,
using the similar techniques, one can easily obtain the epidemic size as
R′(∞) = (1− ρV − δρS) {1− exp [−R
′
0R
′(∞)]} , (9)
where R′0 = (1 − ρV − δρS)R0. Then, the probability of a susceptible individual to be infected
reads
ω =
R′(∞)
1− ρV − δρS
= 1− exp [−R′0R
′(∞)] . (10)
The payoffs of different strategies and states are thus easily to be obtained, which are summarized
in Table 2.
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The imitation dynamics governing the time evolution of the fractions of strategies in the popu-
lation is similar to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory [17, 37], as
dρV
dt
= (ρV ⇄ ρ
H
S ) + (ρV ⇄ ρ
I
S) + (ρV ⇄ ρ
H
L ) + (ρV ⇄ ρ
I
L), (11)
dρS
dt
= (ρHS ⇄ ρV ) + (ρ
H
S ⇄ ρ
H
L ) + (ρ
H
S ⇄ ρ
I
L) + (ρ
I
S ⇄ ρV )
+(ρIS ⇄ ρ
H
L ) + (ρ
I
S ⇄ ρ
I
L), (12)
where
ρV ⇄ ρ
H
S = (ρ
H
S → ρV )− (ρV → ρ
H
S )
= ρV ρ
H
S
{
1
1 + exp [−κ(PV − P
H
S )]
−
1
1 + exp [−κ(PHS − PV )]
}
= ρV ρ
H
S tanh
[κ
2
(PV − P
H
S )
]
= ρV ρS[δ + (1− δ)(1− ω)] tanh
[κ
2
(−c + b)
]
, (13)
and the others are similar.
Denote by ρV (τ) the initial fraction of vaccinated individuals before the (τ + 1)th season of
epidemic spreading. Given ρV (0), ρS(0) and ρL(0), and for each season, we apply the initial
conditions as S(0) = (N ′ − 5)/N ′, I(0) = 5/N ′ and R(0) = 0, where N ′ = (1 − ρV − δρS)N ,
depending on the distribution of strategies at this season. Then, R′(∞) can be obtained by Eq. (9)
and ω by Eq. (10). Using the evolutionary dynamics described in Eqs. (11)-(13) and the fractions
presented in Table 2, one can obtain the values of ρV (1), ρS(1) and ρL(1), which are also the initial
fractions of strategies at the beginning of the next season. Repeat the above steps until the steady
state, then we can calculate the desired variables.
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FIG. 1: Less payoff in better condition. (a) How the fractions of the three strategies and the epidemic size
change with the successful rate of self-protection δ. (b) The epidemic size R∞ and the system payoff P as
functions of δ. (c) Correlation between the system payoff P and the epidemic size R∞, where each data
point corresponds to a certain δ. Panel (a) is divided into three regions by two vertical dash lines: (i) In the
left region, no self-protective individual exists and δ has no effect on the epidemic size; (ii) In the middle
region, the self-protection strategy gradually replaces vaccination and laissez faire, and the epidemic size
increases with δ due to the decrement of vaccination fraction; (iii) In the right region, with high successful
rate of self-protection, individuals are unwilling to take vaccination and the epidemic size decreases with δ.
Parameters are set to be N = 50× 50 = 2500, λ = 0.5, µ = 0.3, b = 0.1, c = 0.4, κ = 10 and I0 = 5. For
this figure and all others (except snapshots), the simulation results are calculated after 1000 seasons when
the system is in a steady state, and each data point is obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs.
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FIG. 2: Strategy distribution patterns. Subgraph (a) shows the epidemic size R∞ as a function of δ. The
window is divided into three parts according to the tendency of R∞ − δ curve. Subgraphs (b), (c), (d) and
(e) are snapshots in the steady state of a season at δ = 0.2, 0.35, 0.5 and 0.95. The grey, light red, dark red,
light blue and dark blue points stand for vaccinated, laissez-faire and not infected, laissez-faire and infected,
self-protective and not infected, and self-protective and infected individuals, respectively. Parameters are
the same as in Figure 1.
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FIG. 3: Insensitivity to the network structures. To explore the impacts of different network structures on
the epidemic size and strategy distribution, we compare the results in square lattices (a), ER networks (b),
BA networks (c) and well-mixed networks (d). The parameters are set as b = 0.1, I0 = 5, c = 0.4, and
κ = 10. Each data point results from an average over 100 independent runs. The average degrees of the
lattices, ER networks and BA networks are all set to be 4, and the simulations presented in subgraph (a),
(b) and (c) are implemented with the same transmission and recovery rate, λ = 0.5 and µ = 0.3. For the
well-mixed network (d), however, the parameters are different from others as λ = 0.0013 and µ = 1 for its
different average degree.
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FIG. 4: Delocalization promotes the self-protection strategy. The subgraphs (a)-(d) show how the frac-
tions of the three strategies and the epidemic size change with δ, and subgraphs (e)-(h) are the corresponding
snapshots for (a)-(d) with δ = 0.6. From (a) to (d), the number of randomized edges, A, increases. Qual-
itatively, the counter-intuitive phenomenon always exists, no matter what the value of A. Quantitatively,
the delocalization reduces the advantage of the laissez-faire strategy, which leads to a larger fraction of
self-protective individuals. When A is large enough, self-protection becomes the dominating strategy for a
certain range of δ. Overall speaking, the epidemic size is smaller at larger A. Parameters are the same as in
Figure 1.
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FIG. 5: The analytical solution agrees well with the simulation. The analytical prediction (b) is in good
accordance with the simulation (a). All results are implemented on a well-mixed network with N = 1000,
c = 0.7, b = 0.1, λ = 0.0013, µ = 1.0, I0 = 5 and κ = 10.
